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Renegotiating the Realm of 
Influence: 
The Shifting Priorities of 
President Trump during 
NAFTA Renegotiations
SANFORD JONES
The politics of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, has oscillated be-tween the outward expression of promoting United States (US) economic prosperity and 
an antagonistic populism that seeks to isolate him and 
his followers from established political norms. This has 
recently manifested in the interrelations between domes-
tic influence and foreign policy. Acting upon a campaign 
promise to enter into a renegotiation with Canada and 
Mexico of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), driven by a perception that this could 
improve economic outcomes for the US, the Trump 
Administration began to establish strategic objectives to 
bring to the negotiating table. While the priorities stated 
by the Administration displayed a moderate and sound 
strategy in line with contemporary economists, a shift in 
policy preference occurred once the renegotiation of the 
agreement began. The Trump negotiating team moved 
toward a decidedly more nationalist posture.
This article examines the factors that caused 
that drastic shift in international trade policy. First, 
it addresses the corporate interests that established 
significant influence on the White House. Second, it 
assesses the moderating influence on trade policy that 
followed from this corporate access. Third, it analyzes 
the rationale behind the imbedded corporate interests 
in trade policy and the importance of NAFTA to 
influential American businesses. A contextual analysis 
follows concerning the President’s comments about 
the 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests and how 
they affected corporate influence in the White House. 
Next, this essay examines the effects of the dissolution 
of access first granted to corporate interests, followed 
by an analysis of populist nationalism and its impact 
on the Administration’s trade negotiations. Finally, the 
implications of these findings on US foreign policy and 
international relations is considered.
Upon entering the Oval Office, President 
Trump established economic advisory councils replete 
with private-sector expertise. One such council, the 
Strategic and Policy Forum, contained a multitude of 
CEOs with the objective of advising the President “on 
how government policy impacts economic growth, 
job creation, and productivity” (Blackstone 2016). 
Similarly, the President instituted a Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative, which sought input from CEOs on 
government policy and regulations with the objective to 
“promote job growth and get Americans back to work 
again” (White House 2017b). Upon being appointed 
chairman of the manufacturing council, Dow Chemical 
CEO Andrew Liveris was optimistic that the Trump 
Administration was “not going to do anything to harm 
competitiveness” (quoted in Meyersohn 2017). While 
ostensibly the councils were established to ensure that 
economic policy aligned with the interests of American 
businesses, their ability to increase job growth and 
competitiveness hinged on access to the White House. 
During preparations for the renegotiation of NAFTA, 
the influence of business interests within the councils 
seemed to deliver a moderating effect on the policy of 
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the Trump Administration, which began by seeking 
trade reforms consistent with internationalist economic 
perspectives.
Before the Trump Administration began the 
process of renegotiations with Canadian and Mexican 
officials, it developed strategic approaches and objectives 
for the international meetings. As NAFTA had not 
been updated in the more than two decades, its 
provisions were in need of adjustment, according to 
many economists and scholars.1 The original negotiating 
points set out by the Trump Administration seemed 
to reflect this. There was a reluctance to simply reject 
the agreement, as had been done with the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) (Irwin 2017, 45). In his report 
to Congress, Robert Lighthizer (2017), the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) for the NAFTA 
renegotiations, outlined a modernization strategy to 
address digital trade, intellectual property, labor, and 
environmental standards. These renegotiation policy 
objectives were not a significant departure from those 
that economic commentators had articulated over the 
course of the agreement’s implementation; indeed, 
the approach taken was notably similar to provisions 
within the proposed TPP (Palmer, Behsudi, and Cassella 
2017). This suggests that the business interests invited 
to advise the White House on economic policy initially 
established a significant influence on international trade 
issues (Neal and Pascrell 2017). The congruence between 
the initial renegotiation provisions, concerns of previous 
US administrations and various expert opinions suggests 
that Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric was initially 
influenced by corporate interests. These interests were 
afforded access to decision-makers through the Strategic 
and Policy Forum and Manufacturing Jobs Initiative 
advisory councils, which gave them an ability to impact 
policy formulation.
The two advisory councils consisted primarily 
of CEOs from the most profitable and influential 
corporations in the US, and while their interests 
differed on many policy issues, a significant number 
of their members benefit from and support the notion 
of a North American free-trade zone.2 Members 
of the Strategic and Policy Forum involved with 
manufacturing, such as General Motors (GM) and 
General Electric (GE), have a preference for free-
trade policies, especially within the North American 
market. With a former CEO on the Strategic and Policy 
Forum and the current CEO on the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative council, GE has been a supportive 
voice for NAFTA renegotiations as a modernization 
attempt (Graham 2017). The position held by GE was 
likely influential; its public positions on NAFTA were 
consistent with the renegotiation objectives presented 
in Lighthizer’s letter to Congress, which highlighted 
the need for reforms in digital trade and intellectual 
1 For recommended reforms to NAFTA see, for example, Hufbauer 
and Schott (2005), Leblond and Fabian (2017), Schoen (1999), or 
Smillie (2017).
2 Among the members of the economic advisory councils are 
financial and manufacturing firms that are involved in transnational 
production in North America and have made statements in support 
of NAFTA; others which neither benefit nor are disadvantaged 
by international trade have mostly remained silent on the issue. 
The major exception is labor. The AFL-CIO and the Alliance for 
American Manufacturing, both represented on the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative, have voiced concerns about lower wages and working 
standards in Mexico and insufficient rules of origin to promote US 
manufacturing, respectively (Trumka 2017; Paul 2017).
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property (General Electric Company 2017; Lighthizer 
2017). Similarly, GM CEO and Strategic and Policy 
Forum member Mary Barra was critical of intentions 
to impose tariffs on continental trade (Gardner 2017). 
Several investment and consulting firms involved in the 
councils had produced reports noting the disruption 
an abandonment of NAFTA would cause, while also 
inferring the need to modernize the agreement (EY 
2017; Wien 2017; Boston Consulting Group 2017). 
During interviews in April of 2017, CEOs on the 
Strategic and Policy Forum reported that the President 
was actively listening to the councils and taking industry 
advice into consideration when formulating policy 
(Kelly 2017b). The diminished rhetoric threatening to 
nullify NAFTA can be attributed to these corporate 
interests (Kelly 2017a). However, as Hopkins (2007) 
points out, the US experienced increasing stress between 
the discourse of nationalist conservatism and assertive 
corporate globalism, with an economy that has expanded 
globally and a politics that remains decidedly local. The 
“fear of foreign invaders, stirred up in the aftermath 
of 9/11, called for the rebuilding of fortress America” 
(Hopkins 2007, 109). This is the conflict within the 
Trump strategy: at one end an economic need of global 
integration and, at another, the local fear of losing a 
moral and cultural identity.
Despite their initial influence in shaping 
renegotiation objectives, the access afforded to members 
of the advisory councils was eventually eliminated. The 
decision to disband the councils was precipitated by 
a majority of the councils’ members deciding to step 
down after inflammatory remarks were made by the 
President about the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ 
protest, in which Trump “appeared to confer legitimacy 
on white supremacists” (Olorunnipa, McCormick, 
and Niquette 2017).3 As the NAFTA negotiations 
began just days after these events, an increasing shift 
was apparent within the Administration, and it began 
to talk about ending the agreement between the US, 
Canada and Mexico.4 Lighthizer’s opening remarks at 
the first round of negotiations in Washington indicated 
that the more moderate tone in strategic objectives 
had been abandoned: “[w]e believe that Nafta [sic] has 
fundamentally failed many Americans and needs major 
improvements” (quoted in Mauldin and Vieira 2017). 
The increase in protectionist nationalism within the 
White House created a chaotic point of uncertainty. 
Trump repeatedly threatened to initiate the NAFTA 
withdrawal mechanism through an executive order. 
The Trump Administration moved farther from the 
goal of modernizing the agreement, favored by the 
business interests of the advisory councils, toward 
populist propositions that were clearly unacceptable 
to others at the negotiating table (Swanson 2017a). 
This was especially evident in the novel suggestion by 
Lighthizer that the renewed agreement should include a 
US-specific content provision for manufactured goods 
4 Whether the disbandment of the advisory councils was by order 
from the President or by way of a consensus within the council is an 
issue unrelated to the one discussed here; the distinction between 
the two possibilities does not address the rationale behind the 
action (Tracer, Williams, and Son 2017). To contend that Trump 
had orchestrated the councils’ dissolution would be to confirm 
a continuation of his populist rhetoric, while alleging that the 
councils disbanded on their own accord would imply that the extent 
of the damage caused by the President’s previous populist rhetoric 
was enough to dissuade collaboration with more moderate business 
interests.
3 It is unclear whether opposition to the President’s remarks about 
the Charlottesville protests, and the resignations that followed, 
represent a moral issue or merely a cost-benefit analysis among 
businesses anxious to distance themselves from the White House.
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rather than the current one that applied to regional 
content in general (Donnan, Nicolaou, and Webber 
2017). Not only was this new negotiating position 
a misrepresentation of the stated goals within the 
Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation 
(USTR 2017), it rejected the once-influential advisory 
councils’ view that such a qualification “would greatly 
complicate the ability of companies, particularly small- 
and medium-size enterprises, to take advantage of the 
benefits of Nafta [sic]” (Matt Blunt quoted in Wall Street 
Journal 2017). Now following nationalist objectives, the 
President increased threats to withdraw if demands were 
not agreed to by Canadian and Mexican counterparts 
(Swanson 2017b).
In the face of an increasingly nationalistic policy 
standpoint, the moderating influence of the advisory 
councils was eliminated and the White House returned 
to the principles on which Trump began his electoral 
campaign. For him, trade was decidedly a zero-sum game 
and disagreement among partners was cause enough 
for an abandonment of alliances.5 This shift away from 
the influence of business interests resonated in other 
spheres. For example, Trump arrested plans to establish 
economic councils on infrastructure (Beech and Burns 
2017). The new protectionist approach focused only 
on US production and reflected the limited effects of 
business influence after the disbanding of the councils. 
This seems to support a theory of opportunity in policy-
5 The implications of a NAFTA abandonment have been the subject 
of increasing study and have been an area of analysis by various 
firms and scholars. Influential reports include Cheney et al. (2017), 
Gertz (2017), Globerman and Sands (2017), Johnson (2017), 
Mosquet, Handschuh, and Wilson (2017), Murphy (2017), Parilla 
and Muro (2017), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2017).
making and influence: corporate influences could have 
an impact on American foreign policy only insofar 
as they have immediate access to the White House. 
Business influence can be more strongly expressed when 
institutions exist to support its advisory capacity. This 
fits within Dahl’s (1998) plurality framework, which 
sees these interests as part of a plurality that influences 
policy through government access structures. When 
these avenues of access break down, pluralism also 
dwindles. While historically influential on government 
policy, business interests have recently become limited 
in their access to the Executive after the disbanding of 
the advisory councils and thus have suffered diminishing 
input in foreign economic policy (Pastor 1980, 45). This 
diminished capacity to influence on the part of corporate 
interest groups has resulted in a more radical nationalist 
position taken by the Trump Administration toward the 
renegotiation of the trade agreement.
This shift constitutes an exceptional circumstance 
in American politics and the President’s populist 
foundation for these actions is clear. The creation of 
the Strategic and Policy Forum and the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative was an ideological expression of free-
market liberalism, one generally embraced by the 
Republican Party. But their destruction was the product 
of radical populist nationalism. The electoral campaign 
and subsequent presidency of Donald Trump took its 
direction from a tradition of “Americans who have a 
natural tendency… to take up positions of fear, hostility, 
militancy, intransigence, and self-righteousness: in other 
words nationalist positions” (Lieven 2012, 83). The 
removal of business influence after Trump’s apparent 
sympathizing with white supremacists exacerbated the 
populist rhetoric of the White House, which now has 
few moderating influences on its policy development. 
The belligerent isolationism taken up by the 
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Administration’s NAFTA negotiating team, which has 
employed a strategy of repeatedly threatening to end the 
Agreement, is the expression of a nationalist populism 
free from the influence of economic elites.6 The formal 
power structures within the Executive once contained a 
regulated agonism between populist nationalism and the 
interests of corporate elites; what Mouffe (2000) would 
call the democratic paradox. But Trump’s demonization 
of Washington elites has nullified that possibility. 
Trump’s rise to power deployed the distinction between 
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ struggling for hegemonic control; in 
this case, a ‘people’s’ antagonism fighting for control 
against a liberal globalist conspiracy. The nature of his 
rise to power, therefore, made the continued existence 
of an institutional agonism impossible (Žižek 2009, 
277-81). The rhetoric the President employed, the 
disbanding of the advisory councils, and the resulting 
shift in renegotiation strategy have each been in line 
with the populist hegemonic struggle for which Trump 
was elected. A white, middle-class, nativist fear of 
cultural loss, dispossession, or alien occupation has led 
to the conspiratorial idea of a liberal dictatorship and 
a hatred for its embodiment in economic elites as well 
as ethnic and religious minorities (Lieven 2012, 85). 
While the abandonment of the advisory councils may 
have been a sign of return to original principles for some 
of Trump’s radical nationalist supporters, it has severely 
damaged the capacity of the NAFTA renegotiations 
to obtain originally stated objectives, or real economic 
6 Mearsheirmer and Walt (2007) exemplify this inequality of 
influence in the case study The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Moreover, Lindblom (1977) demonstrates the effect of wealth on 
the degree of interest group influence on democratic government in 
politics and markets.
advancement in the United States.
Abandoning NAFTA would be incredibly 
damaging to the US economy, though analysts differ 
as to the immediacy of the impact and the degree 
to which corporations in various sectors would be 
affected by this scenario. It is clear, however, that the 
foreign policy strategy of the Trump Administration, 
left unmoderated by critical influences, is harmful 
for American national interests internationally. The 
official policy of the Administration is demonstrably 
lacking in substance on key international issues, with no 
mention of alliances or global challenges save its aim to 
destroy “ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups” 
(White House 2017a). Within the Trump policy frame, 
economic logic is abandoned for nationalist rhetoric. 
Although the withdrawal from NAFTA is explicitly 
offered as a solution within the America First Foreign 
Policy (White House 2017a), it is seen in the frame of 
benefitting manufacturers and American jobs which are 
predominantly the beneficiaries of NAFTA and would 
be likely much worse off within a nationalist economic 
policy (Irwin 2017). The America First Foreign Policy 
strategy in general, and the NAFTA renegotiations 
in particular, have been negligent on the realities of 
American interests and have simplified economic 
problems to the point of illogical conclusions. Rather 
than isolation from the international economy, job 
growth in the US depends on stimulated domestic 
demand and improving competitiveness in business. 
While redressing ongoing trade disputes should be a 
US foreign-policy objective, sacrificing international 
relations with key allies by using belligerent rhetoric 
and policy positions does nothing to improve economic 
conditions and instead exemplifies a contempt for 
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the American liberal-democratic principles that have 
historically increased economic prosperity (Leffler 2017).
US foreign policy has traditionally accepted 
a balanced approach to decision-making with an 
acknowledged role in it for economic interests. This 
has been undermined severely during the presidency 
of Donald Trump. While it is clear that corporate 
interests can exert significant influence on White 
House policy, pluralism within the Executive can exist 
only insofar as competing interests are given access to 
decision-makers. The logic of this influence rests in the 
benefits of democratic agonism within policymaking. 
Given the Trump Administration’s goals of economic 
advancement, these corporate interests represented a 
source of business expertise, stakeholder consultation, 
and moderation within the White House policymaking 
mechanism. However, the populist antagonism displayed 
by President Trump has eliminated the possibility of 
moderation and endangered the renegotiation of the 
trade agreement. In the absence of corporate influence 
on the negotiations, a belligerent nationalist strategy has 
developed in the US Administration that has exacerbated 
the inherent difficulties of renegotiating NAFTA. The 
policy shift made by the Trump Administration is 
damaging not only to international relations but also 
to national economic growth. There appears to be a 
significant sacrifice of national interest for populist tenets 
and it remains to be seen what further repercussions 
this populist shift will have on both domestic and 
international policy formation.
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